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One of the most politically contentious issues facing public
secondary schools today is the debate over whether student Gay/Straight
Alliances ("GSAs") should be officially recognized and allowed to meet
on school premises. A GSA is a student club dedicated to raising
awareness about alternative lifestyles, advocating acceptance for all
students, and providing support for gay students, their families, and
friends.1 Across the country, local school districts are struggling to
formulate policies to deal with the divisive effects the formation of a
GSA often brings to a community. In Hillsborough County, Florida, the
recent formation of a GSA at Newsome High School has been met with
widespread protest.2 In January 2006, the local newspaper reported that
over 1,000 parents signed a petition opposing the club.3 In Rowan
Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2008.
1. See, e.g., Straights and Gays for Equality v. Osseo Area Schs., Civ. No. 05-
2100 (JNE/FLN), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16326, *4 (D. Minn. 2006) (students said
they formed the GSA to "promote tolerance and respect for [high school students]
and faculty through education and activities relevant to gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender ("GLBT") individuals and their allies") (alteration added); Caudillo v.
Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 F. Supp. 2d 550, 556 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (students
stated some of their goals for the GSA were to "[e]ducate those willing about non-
heterosexuals," "[i]mprove the relationship between heterosexuals and
homosexuals," and "[h]elp the community") (alterations added); Colin v. Orange
Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (student explained
that he decided to form a GSA "to promote acceptance among and for gay and
straight students at the school").
2. Chris Echegaray, School Groups Draw Protest, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 22, 2006,
at 1.
3. Id.
County, North Carolina, the local school board has reacted to public
outcry over the formation of a similar student group by banning GSAs in
its public high schools.4 Students, parents, and community members
have staged protests outside the school board's meetings, threatening
legal action if the school system's leaders refuse to change their policy.
5
In some areas, local controversies over GSAs have already
6reached the courts. In Chicago, a federal lawsuit filed last spring by the
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund threatened to bring the local
dispute over the formation of a GSA at Noble Street Charter School to a
boiling point.7 Recently, the school board agreed to recognize the club in
the next school term, bringing an end to the battle, at least for now.8 In
Georgia, another high profile lawsuit over school recognition of a GSA
has ended in settlement as White County High School officials have
4. Holly Fesperman Lee, Crowd Protests Club Ban, SALISBURY POST (North
Carolina), Oct. 10, 2006, available at http://archive.salisburypost.com/archiveindex
.php (search for article title).
5. See id; see also Jim Brown & Jody Brown, School Policy on Sex-Based
Clubs Attracts ACLU's Attention, AGAPE PRESS, Jan. 31, 2007, http://headlines.agap
epress.org/archive/8/292006d.asp; Jessie Burchette, School Board Votes to Ban
Gay/Straight Alliance Club, SALISBURY POST (North Carolina), Aug. 15, 2006,
available at http://archive.salisburypost.com/archive index.php (search for article
title); Kirsten Valle, South Students Can Challenge Gay Club Ban, Group Says,
SALISBURY POST (North Carolina), Apr. 12, 2006, available at http://archive.salisbur
ypost.com/archive index.php (search for article title).
6. See, e.g., Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 258
F. Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (granting plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction and ordering school officials to give GSA members equal access to school
facilities); Franklin Cent. Gay/Straight Alliance v. Franklin Twp. Cmty. Sch. Corp.,
Cause No. IPO-1518-C-M/S, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24981 (S.D. Ind. 2002)
(denying a high school's motion to reconsider a grant of summary judgment to
students); Gay-Straight Alliance Network v. Visalia Unified Sch. Dist., 262 F. Supp.
2d 1088 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (denying school district's motion to dismiss students'
claims); Colin, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (granting plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction because of their strong chance of success against the school on the merits
of their Equal Access Act challenge).
7. Tracy Dell'Angela, 2 Students Sue Charter School; Gay-Straight Alliance
Barred, Lawsuit Says, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 19, 2006, at C3.
8. School to Allow Gay-Straight Group, CHI. TRIB. (Red Eye Edition), June 8,
2006, at 9.
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agreed to recognize a GSA this school year. 9 However, many more
lawsuits over GSAs may be on their way to the court system. 10
The increase in these sorts of disputes follows rapid growth in
the number of GSAs in American public high schools.1 The formation
of GSAs has been on the rise in the last two decades, increasing from
100 recognized clubs in 1997 to at least 3,000 in 2000.12 It is estimated
that today, one in every ten public high schools has a GSA. 13 Many
students who form GSAs, along with their families and other supporters,
contend that GSAs are a positive way to work for acceptance of
homosexual high school students among their peers.
14
9. Press Release, ACLU Hails Settlement in White County, Georgia Gay-
Straight Alliance Case (Jan. 10, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/lgbt/youth/
27893prs2007011 O.html.
10. See Brown & Brown, supra note 5; Seema Mehta, Gay Teens Are Using
the System; Students Fight Personal Cases of Discrimination Through the Courts
and Political Activism, L.A. TIMES (Home Edition), Mar. 12, 2006, at B 1.
11. See, e.g., Lori Aratani, Sex-Ed Battle Hits New Turf- Homosexuality Topic
Splits Montgomery, WASH. POST (MD and District Edition), Dec. 9, 2005, at BI;
Dell'Angela, supra note 7 at C3; Paul Donsky, Board Rejects Rule to Require
Parental OK for School Clubs, ATL. J.-CONST., June 15, 2005, at DI; Irene Sege,
Minds Wide Open: One Girl's Push to Form a Gay Group Forced a School to
Search its Soul, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 8, 2005, at Cl; Stephanie Simon, Parents
Cast Fight as Sexual vs. Religious Tolerance, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2005, at A14;
Dan Wascoe, Gay-Straight Student Group Sues Schools, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis,
MN), Oct. 2, 2005, at BI.
12. See generally John Cloud, The Battle over Gay Teens, TIME, Oct. 10, 2005,
at 42-44, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1112856-
1,00.html.
13. Id.
14. For example, in Colin v. Orange Unified School District, the founder of a
GSA stated the club's mission in the following words:
Public schools have an obligation to' provide an equal
opportunity for all students to receive an education in a
safe, nonhostile, nondiscriminatory environment. Our goal
in this organization is to raise public awareness and
promote tolerance by providing a safe forum for discussion
of issues related to sexual orientation and homophobia. We
wish to stress the need for people to put aside their personal
prejudice and agree to treat everyone with respect when the
situation calls for it. We invite ALL students, gay or
straight, to join us in discussions, field trips, lectures, and
social activities that will counterattack unfair treatment and
372 [Vol. 5
GA Y/STRAIGHT ALLIANCES
Although many people support GSAs, the formation of these
clubs often produces strong public opposition. Large numbers of
students, parents, and administrators oppose the recognition of GSAs in
their local high schools, arguing that the clubs promote undesirable
sexual mores and discuss disruptive content matter that is inappropriate
for school-age children. 5 Some argue that GSAs are an unacceptable
attempt to advance the homosexual agenda in the public school system.
16
For example, the Vice President of the American Family Association
contends that GSAs are "an advancement of the homosexual cause" and
that homosexual activists are using them as a "way to get gay curriculum
in schools."
1 7
The fierce public reaction to GSAs in the school system and the
resulting efforts by local school boards to ban the clubs raise compelling
First Amendment questions. What is the scope of school authority over
student speech? How far may schools go to keep unpopular or
controversial student speech out of their hallways and classrooms? The
existence of federal legislation on the subject further complicates
prejudice. We respect privacy and require NO one to make
disclosures regarding his or her own sexual orientation....
This is not a sexual issue, it is about gaining support and
promoting tolerance and respect for all students.
Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
15. See, e.g., Michael Janofsky, Gay Rights Battlefields Spread to Public
Schools, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2005, at A18; Charles Yoo, Gay Teens Seek Support
and Safety, ATL. J.- CONST., May 8, 2005, at Cl. Opponents of GSAs have begun
advocating for state legislation prohibiting such clubs. Laws have been proposed in
Utah and Virginia, and there is talk of such proposals in Texas, Alabama, and
Tennessee. For example, the Family Policy Network, a conservative advocacy
group, has recently announced it will begin looking for state legislatures to sponsor
these bills in five states, including North Carolina. Wyatt Buchanan, Bills
Nationwide Address Gays in Schools, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 1, 2006, at B1; see also
Allie Martin, Five-State Campaign Promotes Parental OK for Club Participations,
AGAPE PRESS, Aug. 23, 2006, http://headlines.agapepress.org/archive/8/232006c.asp
(reporting on Family Policy Network campaign that would require parental
permission for participation in school clubs). A federal initiative to ban GSAs that
promote sexual behavior in minors passed the House but was killed in the Senate.
Rosalind S. Helderman, Senate Kills Bill Decried as Anti-Gay, WASH. POST, Mar. 3,
2006, at B5.
16. Lisa Pemberton-Butler, A "Safe Place" for Gays or Straights, SEATTLE
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2000, at B 1.
17. Id.
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matters. The Equal Access Act ("EAA") is a federal statute that requires
public schools to provide all student clubs with equal access to school• • • 18
facilities. However, the EAA only applies in certain circumstances and
allows for exceptions. Does the EAA extend protection to GSAs in
public schools?
This note argues that in most circumstances, public schools are
legally required under both the EAA and the First Amendment to
recognize GSAs. The EAA, as interpreted by the courts, prohibits school
attempts to deny recognition and resources to GSAs. Moreover, when a
school bans a GSA, it violates the free speech rights guaranteed to
students under the First Amendment. Before we can determine the
constitutionality of GSA regulations, however, we need to clearly define
the parameters in which the debate takes place. Part I of this note begins
with an introductory look at the current First Amendment law on student
speech in public schools, in order to construct a framework in which to
analyze the constitutional implications of GSA bans. Part II examines
the constitutional origins and judicial interpretation of the EAA to show
that the legislation requires public school recognition of GSAs. The
EAA, based in large part on First Amendment student speech law, was
enacted to protect the rights of public school students in situations such
as this, and as shown in Part III, courts have largely rejected initial
attempts to avoid compliance with the Act. Finally, Part IV describes the
current strategy schools are employing to evade the EAA and First
Amendment requirements, and argues that this tactic should fail under
the courts' interpretation of the EAA as well as First Amendment
precedent. Ultimately, this note concludes that GSA speech does not fall
into any of the exceptions justifying school regulation of student speech
under the EAA or First Amendment, and thus should be afforded
protection from school bans.
I. THE UNDERLYING FIRST AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK
Although the EAA codified much of the First Amendment law
on the subject of student speech, the original constitutional jurisprudence
is still highly relevant in any situation where student speech is
18. See generally Equal Access Act, Pub. L. No. 98-3771 and 98 Stat. 1302
(codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (2000)).
[Vol. 5
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regulated. 19 In order to prevail in litigation over a GSA ban, a school
will not only have to contend with the requirements of the EAA, but will
also have to overcome the large hurdle that the First Amendment places
in its way. An understanding of how the United States Supreme Court
has developed its body of case law concerning the First Amendment
rights of students is critical to analyzing how that framework applies in
the GSA context.
The foundation of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence
dealing with student speech is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District. In 1965, three public high school students
in Des Moines, Iowa, wore armbands to school to protest the Vietnam
War. The school had recently enacted a policy banning students from
wearing armbands, and the students were suspended when they refused
to remove them.2' In the students' lawsuit against the Des Moines
School System, the Supreme Court held that school administrators had
22
violated the First Amendment rights of the students. The Court
acknowledged that although students do not "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," the
level of protection given to student speech might sometimes be lower
than that given to speech in the ordinary public sphere.23 Because
schools have a legitimate interest in controlling their classrooms and
24
hallways, they have a right to regulate speech among their students.
Thus, a balance was needed between the competing interests of the
25
students in freedom of speech and of the school in maintaining order.
The Tinker majority held that if a school is going to censor
student speech, "it must be able to show that its action [is] caused by
something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
_,26
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. In
other words, to justify censorship of student speech, a school must show
19. See Colin, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1140 ("The Equal Access Act was passed to
fit within the Constitutional limits that the Court has placed on school control over
student speech.").
20. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
21. Id. at 504.
22. Id. at 514.
23. Id. at 506.
24. Id. at 507.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 509 (alteration added).
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that allowing that speech would "materially and substantially interfere
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school. ' '27 The Court's language about speech that causes a "material
and substantial disruption" has become an important, oft-used test of
28student speech.
Almost a decade after the Tinker decision, the Court carved out a
major exception to Tinker's protection of student speech in Bethel School
District v. Fraser.2 9 In Bethel, the plaintiff, a public high school student,
gave a speech nominating another student for an elected office at a
school-wide assembly in which he used graphic sexual metaphors.
30
School officials suspended him after he admitted he had deliberately
used sexual innuendo and inappropriate language.3'
In the student's lawsuit against the school, the Supreme Court
upheld the school's actions as constitutional under the First
32Amendment. Distinguishing this case from Tinker, the Court saw an
important difference between "the political 'message' of the armbands in
Tinker and the sexual content of [the student's] speech [in the school
assembly]. 33  The Court said that the school acted well within its
authority to censor obscene student speech to protect the welfare of its
students, holding that "[t]he determination of what manner of speech in
the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with
the school board., 34  Thus, although student speech receives broad
protection under Tinker, schools are allowed to censor speech that is
obscene or vulgar.
35
27. Id. (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
28. See, e.g., Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 F. Supp. 2d 550, 566
(N.D. Tex. 2004) (school officials asserted that GSA "meetings and discussions
would substantially and materially interfere with the orderly conduct of the school's
educational activities within the school"); Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight
Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp. 2d 667, 688-691 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (holding
that allowing a GSA to meet on campus did not substantially disrupt classroom
order).
29. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
30. Id. at 677-78.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 685.
33. Id. at 680 (alterations added).




The Court created another important exception to the Tinker rule
two years later in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.36  In
Hazelwood, members of a public high school's student newspaper staff
objected to the principal's censorship of articles dealing with several
controversial topics, such as the teenage pregnancy experiences of three
high-school students.37 The students alleged that the principal's decision
to pull the article from the publication infringed on their First
38Amendment rights to freedom of speech.
The Supreme Court held that the principal had not violated the
First Amendment in censoring the articles.39  The Court found a
distinction between student personal expression that happens to occur on
school premises and student expression that might reasonably be
assumed to "bear the imprimatur of the school," holding that
administrators should have more authority over the latter.4 ° The Court
wrote:
Educators are entitled to exercise greater control
over this second form of student expression to
assure that participants learn whatever lessons the
activity is designed to teach, that readers or
listeners are not exposed to material that may be
inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that
the views of the individual speaker are not
41erroneously attributed to the school.
Thus, under Hazelwood, schools are authorized to exercise
control over speech to which their official sponsorship could be
42attributed, or which occurs in a curricular setting. This exception could
apply in a number of situations. In the opinion, for example, the Court
noted that a school would have the authority to "refuse to sponsor student
speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol
use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with 'the shared
36. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
37. Id. at 264.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 276.
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values of a civilized social order,' or to associate the school with any
position other than neutrality on matters of political controversy.,
43
The debate over whether schools can regulate student speech that
comes from GSAs is the next development in this line of First
Amendment cases. As we will see, this line of precedent informs and
influences the way both supporters and opponents of GSA speech
structure their arguments. Those in favor of school recognition of GSAs
argue that they are entitled to First Amendment protection under the
general rule in Tinker, while those in favor of a ban on GSAs argue that
they fall under the recognized exceptions in Bethel and Hazelwood. In
Part II, we will see that the federal legislation on the topic of student
clubs has its roots in this law as well.
II. ORIGINS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE EQUAL ACCESS ACT
A brief look at the origins and legislative history of the EAA
demonstrates that the legislation was designed to prevent school officials
from censoring student speech with which they disagree or find• 44
controversial. The beginnings of the EAA are found in the Supreme
Court's early jurisprudence concerning the First Amendment rights of
students. In 1981, in Widmar v. Vincent,45 the Court held that a state
college violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment when it
denied a religious student group access to school facilities and46
resources. The college argued that its denial of access to the group was
an effort to comply with the Establishment Clause by not using student
funds to support religious activity.47 The Court rejected this argument,
holding that a public university could allow religious groups to use its
43. Id. at 272 (internal citation omitted).
44. See, e.g., White County High Peers Rising in Diverse Educ. v. White
County Sch. Dist., Civil Action No. 2:06-CV-29-WCO, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
47955, *37 (N.D. Ga. 2006) ("The legislative history of the EAA makes it clear that
the purpose of the Act was to confirm students' rights to freedom of speech, freedom
of association, and free exercise of religion.") (citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-710; S. Rep.
No. 98-357).
45. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
46. Id. at 265 (the University of Missouri at Kansas City prohibited a religious
group from meeting in school buildings based on a school policy prohibiting the use
of school premises for religious activity).
47. Id. at 270-71.
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facilities without violating the Establishment Clause because this was not• 48
school sponsorship of their particular viewpoints. The Court explained
that "an open forum in a public university does not confer any.. ,,49
imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices. In 1984,
in Bender v. Williamsport Area School District,50 the Third Circuit held
that this equal access policy did not extend to religious groups in
secondary schools, because high school students were less mature and
self-guided 1
Congress responded by extending the Widmar rule to secondary
52schools in the EAA. The EAA, which garnered support from "wide,
bipartisan majorities in both the House and the Senate,, 53 was enacted to
specifically "address perceived widespread discrimination against
religious speech in public schools . . . ., However, the EAA was
written more broadly to prohibit public schools from discriminating
among student clubs on the basis of their political or religious content. 55
The EAA provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary
school which receives Federal financial assistance
and which has a limited open forum to deny equal
access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate
against, any students who wish to conduct a
meeting within that limited open forum on the basis
of the religious, political, philosophical, or other
content of the speech at such meetings.
56
48. Id. at 274.
49. Id.
50. 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds by Bender v.
Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
51. Id. at 551-55.
52. Equal Access Act, Pub. L. 98-3771 and 98 Stat. 1302 (codified at 20
U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (2000)).
53. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 239
(1990).
54. Id. (citing H. R. Rep. No. 98-710, p. 4 (1984); S. Rep. No. 98-357, pp. 10-
11(1984)).
55. Hoppock v. Twin Falls Sch. Dist, 772 F. Supp. 1160, 1161-62 (D. Idaho
1991).
56. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a).
2007]
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The EAA contains a specific definition of the term "limited open forum,"
which triggers its provisions 7 A school creates a limited open forum by
allowing at least one "non-curriculum related" student club to meet on
campus after hours.58 If a school permits one "non-curriculum-related"
group to meet on campus, then the school becomes obligated under the
EAA to give all student clubs equal access to school facilities. 9
Using the Court's First Amendment school speech precedent as
guidance, Congress provided for two exceptions to the general rule
requiring a school to provide equal access to all student clubs. First, the
EAA only requires a school to recognize an extra-curricular club as long
as allowing the club to meet "does not materially and substantially
interfere with the orderly conduct of educational activities within the
school. Second, the EAA expressly provides that it should not be
interpreted to "limit the authority of the school, its agents or employees,
to maintain order and discipline on school premises, to protect the well-
being of students and faculty, and to assure that attendance of students at
meetings is voluntary.",61 These exceptions echo the language of Tinker,
which held that schools are entitled to censor speech that poses a material
and substantial disruption to school order.62 These two exceptions to the
EAA's requirements have become major components in the defense-of-
school actions in GSA litigation, as schools seeking to evade the EAA
have tried to fit banning a GSA into one of these two exceptions.63
Soon after the EAA was enacted, the Supreme Court upheld its
constitutionality in Board of Education of Westside Community Schools
v. Mergens.64 In Mergens, school officials denied students' request to
form a Christian Bible study club that would meet after class on school
57. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b).
58. Id.
59. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 236.
60. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(4).
61. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(f).
62. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
63. See, e.g., Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 F. Supp. 2d 550, 568
(N.D. Tex. 2004) (school board alleged GSA was a substantial disruption to school
order); Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp.
2d 667, 688 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (school argued GSA posed a threat to order and
discipline within the school).
64. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
GA Y/STRAIGHT ALLIANCES
65property. When the students brought suit against the school system
under the EAA, the school board argued that the EAA violated the
66Establishment Clause. The Court upheld the EAA under the
Establishment Clause, and mandated that school officials were bound
under the legislation to recognize the Bible club.67
In Mergens, the Court explained the standard for determining
whether or not a club is entitled to access to school facilities under the
Equal Access Act. The EAA protects only non-curriculum-related clubs,
leaving schools broad authority to regulate the content of curriculum-
related clubs. 68 The Mergens Court explained that "a curriculum-related
student group is one that has more than just a tangential or attenuated
relationship to courses offered by the school ... a student group that is
'curriculum-related' must at least have a more direct relationship to the
curriculum than a religious or political club would have.",
69
The Mergens Court set out four factors to help schools and
reviewing courts determine whether a particular club should be classified
as curriculum-related. These four factors are: (1) whether the group
discusses subject matter that is taught in a regularly offered course; (2)
whether the group discusses subject matter that applies to the body of
high school courses more generally; (3) whether participation in the
group is required for a certain course; and (4) whether academic credit is
71given for participation in the group.
For example, the Court pointed out that a French club would be
considered curriculum-related because it directly relates to a French class
taught by the school. 72 Similarly, a school-sponsored band would be
curriculum-related if the students who participated in the program
received academic credit for their work.73 Groups that are directly tied to
a school's educational goals are not the sorts of clubs that trigger the
EAA. Rather, the clubs that create a limited open forum under the EAA
65. Id. at 232.
66. Id. at 233.
67. Id. at 247-53.
68. See id. at 235-36.
69. Id. at 238.
70. Id. at 239-40.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 240.
73. Id.
2007]
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are those that have no relation to courses taught in school, such as chess
clubs or stamp-collecting clubs7 4 Once a school has recognized at least
one such club, then the school has created a limited open forum and is
subject to the requirements of the EAA.75
III. COURTS' REJECTION OF INITIAL ATTEMPTS TO EVADE THE EAA
Today, the issue of whether or not a club is curriculum-related
plays a key role in GSA litigation. After Mergens, schools saw that one
way to keep control over student groups was to maintain a closed forum
that would avoid triggering the EAA. This strategy was first used in the
76early 1990s in an effort to keep out Christian Bible clubs, and more
recently, has been extended to attempt to ban GSAs.77
In general, courts have applied the Mergens factors strictly to
require that if a school desires to maintain a closed forum, it must ensure
that all student groups at that school are directly related to the
curriculum. 78  For example, in Pope v. East Brunswick Board of
79
Education, the Third Circuit applied the Mergens factors to reject a
school decision to maintain a closed forum in the face of a Christian
74. Id.
75. See id. at 236 (explaining that once a public school allows a non-
curriculum-related group to meet on school premises, it creates a limited open forum
to which the requirements of the EAA apply).
76. See, e.g., Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211 (3d Cir.
2003) (holding that the high school had triggered the EAA by opening the forum to
at least one non-curriculum-related club); Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that the high school was required under the EAA to allow equal
access to a Bible club because it had opened the forum); Pope v. East Brunswick Bd.
of Educ., 12 F.3d 1244 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that the high school had in fact
opened its forum and was obligated to conform to the EAA).
77. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
78. See White County High Peers Rising in Diverse Educ. v. White County
Sch. Dist., Civil Action No. 2:06-CV-29-WCO, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47955, at
*37 (N.D. Ga. 2006) ("Congress, through its enactment of the EAA, and the
Supreme Court, through its interpretation of the term 'curriculum related,' have
constructed a strict framework in which schools can operate with regard to student
groups."); East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166,
1180 (D. Utah 1999) ("The court must examine the record of the student groups'
actual activities as well as their stated purposes in order to make a qualitative
determination as to curriculum-relatedness.").
79. 12 F.3d 1244 (3d Cir. 1993).
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Bible club's request for recognition. In Pope, the plaintiffs were
members of a student Bible club that met once a week before school in
81the cafeteria. In response to the Mergens decision, the East Brunswick
school board had adopted a policy providing that only curriculum-related
clubs that were officially sponsored by the school would be allowed
82access to school facilities. The policy specifically stated that the school
board intended to maintain a closed forum under the EAA.83 While some
clubs were disbanded under the new policy, many clubs that did not
contain a direct tie to the curriculum were still allowed to meet.
84
Members of the Bible club sued the school district when school
administrators refused to recognize the club, alleging violations of the
First Amendment and the EAA.85
The Third Circuit concluded that although schools retain the
right to maintain closed forums, East Brunswick High had opened its
forum by allowing at least one non-curriculum-related student group, the
Key Club, to meet on school premises. 86 Under the Mergens factors, the
80. Id. at 1251-54.
81. Id. at 1246.
82. Id. at 1247.
83. Id. The important part of the school board's policy was as follows:
All co-curricular clubs and activities to be approved for
Board sponsorship shall be directly related either to specific
subject matter which is the subject of one or more courses
offered in the school district, concern the body of courses
offered as a whole, or provide experiences which
are deemed by the school district to enhance understanding
of a course or courses offered within the district
curriculum. The Board may also, from time to time,
approve and sponsor co-curricular activities including but
not limited to intramural and interscholastic athletic or
academic squads, student government and scholastic
achievement organizations, and service activities.
Id.
84. Id. ("Many clubs not obviously associated with the East Brunswick
curriculum, however, returned in the new school year, including Drama, Folio (Art),
Folio (Literary), Institute for Political/Legal Education Club, Students Against
Drunk Drivers, Students Against Violating the Environment, and the Key Club, a
service organization associated with Kiwanis.")
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1254. A Key Club is a "student service organization affiliated with
Kiwanis" that performs fund-raising events for local charities. Id. at 1251.
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court held that the Key Club was a non-curriculum-related club, the
recognition of which placed the school under the mandate of the EAA.87
Although a history class taught at the high school discussed the subject
of poverty and homelessness, the court held that there was not a
sufficient nexus between discussion of the historical context of a social
condition and the community services the Key Club provided. Thus,
because the school had opened the forum by not requiring a sufficiently
close connection between the Key Club and classroom material, the
school was required to recognize the Bible club.89
This tactic of closing the school's forum to avoid triggering the
EAA has been employed more recently by schools seeking to keep GSAs
from claiming access to school facilities. 90 Courts have generally been
similarly strict with this approach and have rejected school attempts to
strategically close the forum to avoid recognition of a GSA. For
example, in East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Board of Education,9I the
Federal District Court for the District of Utah refused to allow a school
to use a closed forum as a shield for a discriminatory policy. In East
High, student members of a GSA challenged the Salt Lake City School
District's policy refusing to allow student groups that were unrelated to
the school curriculum to meet on school premises.92 The students argued
that despite the school's stated policy of maintaining a closed forum, the
school had permitted five non-curriculum-related clubs to meet on
campus during the year, thereby opening the forum and subjecting the
school to the requirements of the EAA.9 3
The plaintiffs alleged that the school had allowed the
Improvement Council of East High ("ICE"), the Future Homemakers of
America ("FHA"), the Future Business Leaders of America ("FBLA"),
87. Id. at 1251-54.
88. Id. at 1253.
89. Id. at 1256.
90. See, e.g., White County High Peers Rising in Diverse Educ. v. White
County Sch. Dist., Civil Action No. 2:06-CV-29-WCO, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
47955 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (holding that the school had opened the forum by allowing
several non-curriculum-related clubs to meet); East High Gay/Straight Alliance v.
Bd. of Educ., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Utah 1999) (rejecting school's argument that
it maintained a closed forum).
91. 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166.
92. Id. at 1168-69.
93. Id. at 1173.
[Vol. 5
the National Honor Society ("NHS"), and an Odyssey of the Mind team
("OM") to meet on school premises.94 The court applied the Mergens
factors to each of these clubs, and held that four of the five clubs met the
standard for curriculum-relatedness.95 However, the ICE did not meet
the Mergens criteria for a curriculum-related club because there was no
academic credit given for participation in the club, there was no
requirement of participation, and the subject matter did not directly relate
to classroom material.96 Thus, the court concluded that the school had
created a limited open forum and was therefore obligated to provide
equal access to all non-curriculum-related clubs, including the GSA.
97
In the more recent case of White County High Peers Rising in
Diverse Education v. White County School District,98 the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia held that a school could not
ban the GSA if it had any other student clubs that were non-curriculum-
related.99 In White County, members of PRIDE, a GSA formed by
students at White County High School, challenged a school board
decision to ban all non-curriculum-related clubs from meeting on school
property. The plaintiffs argued that despite this ban on non-
curriculum-related student clubs, there were seven non-curriculum-
related clubs that were allowed to meet on campus, including the Beta
Club, the Dance Team, the Student Council, the Youth Advisory
Council, the Prayer Group, and others. 10 1 The court held that at least
some of these groups were in fact non-curriculum-related under the
Mergens test. °2 The Prayer Group, Dance Team, Student Council, and
Youth Advisory Council were found unrelated to the school's curriculum
because they were not directly tied to classroom subject matter and were
not clubs in which participation was required or rewarded with academic
credit. 10 3 The court agreed that because the school had allowed at least
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1180-85.
96. Id. at 1180-81.
97. Id. at 1184-85.
98. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47955 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
99. Id. at *41.
100. Id. at *6.
101. Id.
102. Id. at* 15-35.
103. Id. at *18-32; see also Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v.
Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (holding that because the school
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one non-curriculum-related group to meet and organize on campus,
administrators were bound by the EAA to recognize PRIDE.
10 4
Thus, if a school adopts a policy closing the forum in order to
prevent a GSA from meeting on campus, the school must ensure that any
student club allowed to meet can successfully pass the Mergens test for
curriculum-relatedness. Unless a school is careful to restrict its closed
forum to strictly curriculum-related clubs, the school leaves itself open to
a challenge that it has created a limited forum that subjects it to the
requirements of the EAA. Once a court finds at least one club
insufficiently related to the curriculum under the Mergens test, the school
then becomes obligated to recognize all student clubs. Courts have
shown themselves willing to apply the Mergens factors strictly, and
strategic attempts to bypass the requirements of the EAA by artificially
closing the forum have failed.
IV. AN EMERGING STRATEGY FOR EVADING THE EAA AND FIRST
AMENDMENT
A federal district court's holding in the recent case of Caudillo v.
Lubbock Independent School District'°5 has spawned a new strategy for
school systems looking to avoid recognition of a GSA under the EAA.106
Instead of strategically maintaining a closed forum, a school could create
a limited open forum, but define the GSA in such a way that it is
classified as curriculum-related and thus outside of the reach of the EAA.
had created a limited open forum by allowing the drama club and Bible club to meet
on school premises, it was required to recognize a GSA).
104. White County, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47955 at *41.
105. 311 F. Supp. 2d 550 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
106. See Straights and Gays for Equality v. Osseo Area Schs., Civ. No. 05-
2100 (JNE/FLN), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16326 (D. Minn. 2006) (analyzing
school's assertion that SAGE was a curricular group outside the reach of the EAA
and thus not entitled to greater access to school resources); Colin v. Orange Unified
Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1139-49 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (school argued that the
GSA was not protected by the EAA because it was related to the curriculum taught
in a health class); see also Brian Berkley, Note, Making Gay Straight Alliance
Student Groups Curriculum-Related: A New Tactic for Schools Trying To Avoid the
Equal Access Act, 61 WASH & LEE L. REv. 1847 (2004) (arguing that schools can
gain control over GSAs by tying them to the curriculum).
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This strategy, inspired to some extent by the holding in Caudillo, has
emerged as a tactic for schools that want to censor GSAs.
In Caudillo, student members of the Lubbock High Gay/Straight
Alliance challenged the school's decision to deny the club access to
school premises. 107 In this case, the GSA maintained a website which,
for a brief period, contained links to sexually explicit material, including
articles on homosexual sex.' 8 The school argued that it was entitled to
ban the club under both the EAA and the First Amendment. First, the
school argued that it did not have to recognize the GSA because the
club's speech fell into the two exceptions to the EAA: it posed a material
and substantial disruption to school order, as well as a serious threat to
student well-being.' 0 9 The court agreed that the school was justified in
censoring sexually explicit speech that posed a threat of disruption or
harm to students under both the "maintaining-order-and-discipline"
exception and the "well-being-of-the-students" exception to the EAA.
11 0
Second, the school employed a variety of arguments to defend
itself against the students' First Amendment claims. Under Bethel, the
school claimed it could ban the GSA because the group discussed
explicit content matter that was inappropriate for high school students.
The school asserted that any student group "based upon sexuality,
whether heterosexual or homosexual, is inappropriate in the secondary
school setting.""' The court accepted this argument, noting that the
Supreme Court has held that "it [is] appropriate for educators to protect
students from sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech." 112 The school
also argued that it was entitled under Hazelwood to regulate speech that
ran counter to its educational mission, namely, its "abstinence only"
health education policy. 113 Because the GSA had links to sexually-
explicit material on its website, the school contended that the club's
speech would undermine the school's abstinence only policy by
107. Caudillo, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 558.
108. Id. at 557.
109. Id. at 565-66 (the school board asserted that allowing a GSA to meet on
campus "would be in contradiction of maintaining order and discipline as well as
contradicting the students' well-being").
l10. Id. at 570.
111. Id. at 560.
112. Id. at 562 (alteration added).
113. Id. at 568.
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providing access to sexual content.' 14 The court agreed, holding that a
school is not required to tolerate speech that is out of line with its basic
educational mission.'1 5 The court wrote:
In summation, this case has nothing to do with a
denial of rights to students because of their sexual
viewpoints. It is instead an assertion of a school's
right not to surrender control of the public school
system to students and erode a community's
standard of what subject matter is considered
obscene and inappropriate. At some point, a line
must be drawn that considers the proper subject
matter allowed in the schools of this country. The
effects of exposing minors to sexual material
before they are mature enough to understand its
consequences and far-reaching psychological
ramifications compels a school district to step in
and draw such a line.
116
The Caudillo opinion opened a new avenue of argument for
schools that wish to ban GSAs while still allowing other non-curricular
clubs. Inspired by the Lubbock School Board's use of its abstinence
policy as a way to tie the GSA to its curriculum, some schools now argue
that GSAs are curriculum-related in that they discuss the subject matter
of sex. 17 This strategy of defining GSAs as curriculum-related has two
main goals. First, defining a GSA as curriculum-related takes it outside
of the purview of the EAA, eliminating the statutory obligation to
recognize the club. Second, defining a GSA in terms of sexual subject
matter facilitates arguments under Bethel and Hazelwood that a school is
justified under the First Amendment in regulating the club's speech.
In using this theory, however, a school will run into two large
obstacles. First, under the current judicial interpretation of the EAA, a
114. Id. at 565-68.
115. Id. at 563.
116. Id. at 572.
117. See Burchette, supra note 5 (describing the policy reasons behind the
school board's decision to ban GSAs from the county's high schools); Valle, supra
note 5 (reporting the school board's unanimous decision to ban GSA's from Rowan
County schools as based in part on the existence of the school system's abstinence-
only policy).
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school might not be able to sufficiently prove a link between the school
curriculum and subject matter discussed in the GSA that is close enough
to classify the GSA as curriculum-related, particularly since it is unlikely
after Caudillo that any GSA will continue to have any connection to
explicit sexual content. In fact, two federal district courts have already
applied the Mergens factors to GSAs, and have found that they were not
curriculum-related.1 
18
Second, even if a court decides that a GSA could be classified as
curriculum-related, a school ban on GSA speech is likely to be found a
violation of those students' First Amendment rights to free speech. As
long as students keep the material discussed in their GSA free from
obscene or explicit subject matter, their club should enjoy protection
from school censorship under the EAA and the First Amendment.
Attempts by schools to make GSAs curriculum-related in order
to have control over their content should not succeed under the EAA.
First, a school is required under the EAA to prove more than just a broad
connection between subject matter taught in class and a club. The
Mergens Court, and indeed the legislators who drafted the EAA,
anticipated that a school might try to tie a student club to a curricular
subject in order to gain control over its speech and take it outside the
reach of the EAA.119 The Mergens Court specifically rejected the
argument that a group must only be generally related to a course taught
in the curriculum, observing that allowing schools "[tjo define
'curriculum related' in a way that results in almost no schools having
limited open fora, or in a way that permits schools to evade the Act by
strategically describing existing student groups, would render the Act
merely hortatory. 1 20 The lower court in Mergens had predicted that a
school district might "choose which student clubs it wanted to allow by
tying the purposes of those student clubs to some broadly defined
118. See Straights and Gays for Equality v. Osseo Area Schs. Dist. 279, Civ.
No. 05-2100 (JNE/FLN), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16326 (D. Minn. 2006); Colin v.
Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1138-50 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
119. See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 244
(1990) (citing 130 CONG. REc. 19222 (1984) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("[A] limited
open forum should be triggered by what a school does, not by what it says.")
(alteration in original)).
120. Id. (alteration added).
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educational goal," which would be "exactly the result that Congress
sought to prohibit by enacting the [EAA].''
Thus, under Mergens, a loose connection between the curriculum
and a GSA will not be enough to avoid triggering the EAA. In order to
be deemed curriculum-related, the GSA has to pass the four factor
Mergens test, in which a court considers whether the group discusses
subject matter that is taught in a regularly offered course, whether the
group discusses subject matter that applies to the body of high school
courses more generally, whether participation in the group is required for
a certain course and whether academic credit is given for participation in
the group. 122 At least two federal district courts have expressly rejected
the argument that a GSA is sufficiently related to the curriculum to be
considered beyond the scope of the EAA. In Straights and Gays for
Equality (SAGE) v. Osseo Area Schools123 and Colin v. Orange Unified
School District,124 two federal district courts applied the Mergens factors
to GSAs and concluded that the clubs did not meet the standard for
curriculum-relatedness.
In SAGE, a GSA formed by students at Maple Grove High
School in Minnesota challenged the school's refusal to recognize it as a
school-sponsored club.12' At the time, Maple Grove High recognized
about sixty student organizations, nine of which were designated "non-. ,126
curricular.' While "curricular" clubs were school-sponsored and
allowed to use the public address system, yearbook, and scrolling screen
to advertise meetings and events, "non-curricular" clubs were not.
127
Among those groups categorized as "curricular" were the Student
Government, Students Against Drunk Driving, National Honor Society,
and various sports teams. SAGE, on the other hand, was considered
"non-curricular," so it could "only announce meetings by placing posters
on a community bulletin board and outside its meeting space."
128
121. Id. at 244-45 (alteration added) (citing Mergens v. Bd. of Educ. of
Westside Cmty. Schs. (Dist. 66), 867 F.2d 1076, 1078 (8th Cir. Neb. 1989)).
122. Id. at 239-40.
123. Civ. No. 05-2100 (JNE/FLN), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16326 (D. Minn.
2006).
124. 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1144-45 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
125. SAGE, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16326, at *2-6.




Stating that "[a] school system cannot evade the EAA's
requirements by strategically describing existing student groups or by
claiming that the group's activities are 'remotely related to abstract
educational goals, ' ', 129 the court held that SAGE was entitled to equal
access to school premises.' 30 The court reasoned that since groups like
the cheerleading team and National Honor Society were not closely
related to the school's curriculum, SAGE also deserved school
•. 131
recognition.
Similarly, in Colin v. Orange Unified School District, 13 a federal
district court rejected a school district's argument that a GSA was
curriculum-related because it dealt with the topic of sexuality, which
would be discussed in a health class during the year. 33 The court held
that "[e]ven if there were some overlap between what the students
wanted to talk about and a subject covered in the curriculum [at the
school], a greater nexus is required or else the club is still considered
'noncurriculum related' under the Equal Access Act."1 34
Moreover, the Colin court pointed out that to hold otherwise
would be incongruous with the original purpose of the EAA. 135 The
court explained that in Mergens, the Supreme Court wrote that:
"Because the purpose of granting equal access is to
prohibit discrimination between religious or
political clubs on the one hand and other
noncurriculum-related student groups on the other,
the Act is premised on the notion that a religious or
political club is itself likely to be a noncurriculum-
related group."'
136
As these two cases illustrate, it is difficult for a GSA to satisfy
the Mergens factors for curriculum-relatedness. The third and fourth
129. Id. at *12 (alteration added) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty.
Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 244-45 (1990)).
130. Id. at *19-20.
131. Id. at *"14-15.
132. 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
133. Id. at 1139-40.
134. Id. at 1145 (alterations added).
135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226, 238 (1990)).
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factors cannot be met because a high school seeking to ban a GSA
certainly would not require participation in the group or give academic
credit to its members. Additionally, there is a strong argument that the
second factor is not met either: GSA subject matter does not apply to the
body of high school courses generally. GSAs talk primarily about
alternative sexual orientations, tolerance of different lifestyles, and
political and social strategies for achieving acceptance of diversity in
public schools-subjects that do not seem to be the primary focus of a
mainstream high school education.
However, a school may argue that an abstinence-only policy
informs its entire curriculum, so under the second Mergens factor, a club
that discusses sexual behavior applies to the entire curriculum by
contradicting the school's message. If a court found that a school
system's abstinence-only policy was one of the foundational goals of its
educational vision, then this factor might potentially be met. A GSA
could also conceivably satisfy the first factor, which asks whether the
group discusses subject matter taught in a regularly offered course. A
GSA might discuss some content that would be taught in a regularly
offered health course, in that a school's health curriculum might teach
abstinence before marriage or heterosexual family structures.
In Mergens, however, the Supreme Court required more than
that. The Mergens Court found that clubs that were "extensions" of the
curriculum, such as a French club or a Drama club, were curriculum-
related. 137 Thus, to satisfy the first prong of the Mergens test, a school
would have to convince a court that the GSA was an extension of the
classroom. This would be a difficult task. For example, in Pope, the
court required a very strict connection between an academic class and a
curriculum-related club. 38 In that case, the court refused to hold that the
Key Club, whose mission was to perform community service to
underserved citizens in the community, was an extension of a history
class that contained a unit on poverty.' 39 Similarly, a GSA that discusses
137. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 246.
138. See Pope v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 12 F.3d 1244, 1252-54 (3d Cir.
1993) ("[T]he curriculum-relatedness of student activities must be determined by
reference to the primary focus of the student activity measured against the significant




specific issues relating to sexual orientation likely would not be seen as
an extension of an academic class that has a unit on abstinence.
Even if a court did find that a GSA met the necessary Mergens
factors to be considered curriculum-related, the school's decision to ban
the GSA would constitute a violation of the First Amendment. Under
Tinker, students have a constitutional right to freedom of speech in
public schools. 14  Therefore, a school board attempting to regulate the
content of student speech coming from a GSA has to fit that speech into
one of the exceptions carved out of the general rule. 141  More
specifically, to constitutionally censor a GSA, the school has to argue
either that the club's speech is a material and substantial disruption to
school order, 142 that the speech in question is lewd or vulgar for an
audience of students, 143 or that permitting a club to organize, meet and
use school facilities amounts to school sponsorship of that organization,
and thus under Hazelwood, the school has a right to regulate that
speech. 
144
One argument school boards have used to gain control over GSA
speech has been that GSAs discuss controversial subject matter that
poses a material and substantial disruption to school order.145 A school
board will have to produce more than community controversy to prove
that a GSA causes a disruption that rises to the level required by Tinker
and subsequent cases. In Boyd County High School Gay Straight
Alliance v. Board of Education, the school board argued that the
proposed GSA created widespread community outrage that jeopardized
the school's ability to maintain order and discipline in its classrooms.
146
The court noted that at community meetings on the subject of the GSA,
community members had been violently angry and outspoken on the
subject. 147 However, the court rejected the school board's argument,
140. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
141. See supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text.
142. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
143. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
144. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
145. See Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 F. Supp. 2d 550, 568
(N.D. Tex. 2004); Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ.,
258 F. Supp. 2d 667, 687 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
146. Boyd, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 688.
147. Id. at 673-75 (noting that parents had made threatening comments, staged
an on-campus protest, and damaged a faculty advisor's car).
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pointing out that "the disruption to which [school officials] were
responding when they voted to ban all clubs was caused by GSA
opponents, not GSA club members themselves., 148 The Boyd court
wrote that to justify the GSA ban under Tinker, the school board had to
show that the activities of the actual club members interfered with school
officials' ability to maintain order. 149  The court concluded that the
school board had not met this burden, writing that "[t]here was no proof
elicited during the hearing that, if the GSA Club were provided equal
access, [the school board's] ability to discipline any student who is
disruptive would be diminished in any way."'150 The defendants had
produced only one piece of documented evidence of disruption caused by
the GSA at school. 15  During the school year, "regularly scheduled
classroom activities were not altered in any way, teachers were not
prevented from teaching, and students who attended school were not
prevented from learning."'
52
Moreover, in Tinker, the Supreme Court set a fairly strict
standard for what student behavior would count as a "material and
substantial disruption":
In Tinker .. .[t]he Court rejected arguments
that the students could be punished for wearing
their armbands because school authorities had an
'urgent wish to avoid the controversy which might
result from the expression,' because other students
made hostile remarks to the children wearing
armbands, because students argued in class about
the armbands instead of paying attention, or
because responses to the armbands might lead
other students to start an argument or cause a
disturbance.' 53
148. Id. at 688 (alteration added).
149. Id. at 690.
150. Id. (alterations added).
151. Id. at 675 (one student left the classroom "because of supposed pressure
from GSA supporters").
152. Id. at 691.
153. Id. at 689 (alteration added) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 508, 510, 518 (1969)) (other internal citations omitted).
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Many of these responses have also come up in the GSA context,1 54 but in
light of Tinker, this behavior still does not measure up to the standard of
"material and substantial disruption."
Additionally, courts have shown support for the argument that
the mere fact that school officials and even fellow students might
disagree with the content matter of a particular club does not make that
club a "material and substantial disruption." For example, the Supreme
Court has stated that:
Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on
the campus, that deviates from the views of another
person may start an argument or cause a
disturbance. But our Constitution says we must
take this risk, and our history says that it is this sort
of hazardous freedom-this kind of openness-that
is the basis of our national strength and of the
independence and vigor of Americans who grow
up and live in this relatively permissive, often
disputatious, society.
55
Similarly, the district court in Colin wrote that:
The [School] Board Members may be
uncomfortable about students discussing sexual
orientation and how all students need to accept
each other, whether gay or straight. As in Tinker,
however, when the school administration was
uncomfortable with students wearing symbols of
protest against the Vietnam War, Defendants
cannot censor the students' speech to avoid
discussions on campus that cause them discomfort
or represent an unpopular viewpoint.
156
Thus, the standard for what a court would consider materially and
substantially disruptive to school order requires school boards to come
154. For example, in Boyd, a group of students stood outside the school
entrance before classes began and told incoming students that if they went into the
school, they were "supporting faggots." Id. at 674. Some students also wore t-shirts
with messages opposing the GSA. Id. at 671.
155. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-509 (internal citation omitted).
156. Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1149 (C.D. Cal.
2000) (alteration added).
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up with concrete, actual instances in which their authority was threatened
by student behavior. Community outrage, controversial discussion, and
widespread disagreement with a GSA's message should not be enough to
bring a GSA ban under the Tinker exception.
The second tactic school boards have used to evade the EAA is
the "lewd and vulgar" exception from Bethel. In fact, this is probably the
most potent defense a school board can use. In the Caudillo case, for
example, the school board successfully used the Bethel "lewd and
vulgar" exception to justify its ban on a GSA.157 In that case, the court
held that a school could ban a GSA because the group discussed explicit
content matter that was inappropriate for high school students.
58
Students in a GSA who discuss sexual matter run the large risk that they
could doom their club from being granted school access. Courts have
been willing to uphold school censorship of indecent speech, and GSA
clubs would do well to refrain from putting themselves in the position of
having to defend their discussion of explicit sexual materials. However,
a club that refrains from discussing sexual content matter should be able
to avoid a challenge under Bethel.
The third argument that school boards have used to justify a ban
on GSAs is that when a school allows a GSA to meet on campus,
distribute fliers, hold events, and use campus facilities and equipment,
that school is entitled to control that club's speech because it bears the
school's imprimatur. Under Hazelwood, a school is authorized to
regulate speech to which its sponsorship could reasonably be assumed by
the public.'59 The Supreme Court has held that "[a] school must be able
to set high standards for the student speech that is disseminated under its
auspices ... and may refuse to disseminate student speech that does not
meet those standards."'160 Thus, a school is well within its authority to
refuse to recognize student speech that would "associate the school with•,,16 1
any position other than neutrality on matters of political controversy.
157. Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 F. Supp. 2d 550, 562 (N.D.
Texas 2004). For a discussion of the facts and holding of Caudillo, see supra notes
107-116 and accompanying text.
158. Caudillo. 311 F. Supp. 2d. at 562.
159. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-71 (1988).
160. Id. at 271-72 (alteration added).
161. Id. at 272.
396 [Vol. 5
In East High, the school board argued that allowing a GSA to
meet and use school facilities would create the impression that the school
was sponsoring a particular viewpoint on a political issue, and thus they
were authorized to refuse recognition under Hazelwood.162 The court
rejected this argument, asserting that allowing a student GSA to meet on
school premises "does not affirmatively promote particular student
speech." 63 The court wrote that although school officials have the
authority to control student speech in the classroom, this power "does not
translate into broad discretion to regulate student expression in the
context of student clubs and groups meeting on school premises during
non-instructional time." 16 The court rejected the idea that a school could
reasonably be seen as promoting homosexual tolerance simply by
allowing a GSA to meet on campus.
An even stronger argument in favor of the GSA under this
exception is the fact that, in the case of religious clubs that meet after
school, the Supreme Court has held that allowing religious clubs to meet
after school does not violate the Establishment Clause. 165 In Mergens,
the Court rejected the argument that high school students would not be
able to tell the difference between a school providing equal access to
facilities to all clubs and school sponsorship of a particular viewpoint.
166
Because the Court has held that a school does not sponsor a Christian
club when it meets after school, it is unlikely that the Court would hold
that a school sponsors a social activism club when it meets after school.
Thus, many attempts by schools to regulate GSAs are difficult to
maintain in the face of controlling precedent holding that independent,
student-run clubs are entitled to some degree of First Amendment
protection. This note has demonstrated that the EAA should apply to
school recognition of GSAs, based on the constitutional origins,
legislative intent, and judicial interpretation of the statute. Early attempts
162. East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166,
1194 (D. Utah 1999).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1195.
165. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 247-53
(1990) (holding that schools did not advance religion by allowing religious clubs to
meet on their premises); see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S.
98, 112-20 (2001) (holding that a school's exclusion of a Christian club from using
school space after hours was unconstitutional).
166. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250.
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to evade the EAA have been largely unsuccessful, and the new strategy
should similarly fail. But even if a court decides that a GSA sufficiently
meets the Mergens test for curriculum-relatedness, and thus is outside the
reach of the EAA, a school board wishing to ban a GSA must still
contend with the First Amendment, whose provisions will prove to be a
formidable hurdle.
CONCLUSION
In Tinker, Bethel, and Hazelwood, the Supreme Court seemed to
struggle with the competing interests of the school boards and students.
On one hand, it wanted to protect students' freedom of speech; but at the
same time, it wanted to refrain from interfering with the public's
authority to control its children's schools through the decisions of itsS•, 167
elected school officials. There is language in all three cases
acknowledging that parents and the general public, through their schools,
have primary control over the education of their students, and have the
right to regulate disruptive student speech that threatens their basic
educational mission.
168
Courts have recognized that parents bear primary control over
what public schools teach their children. 169 Parents are entitled to direct
the upbringing of their children, 170 and as voters and taxpayers they have
some power over the educational vision of their schools. However, our
167. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Bethel
Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681-85 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 508, 511-13 (1969).
168. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 ("[T]he education of the Nation's youth
is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school
officials, and not of federal judges." (alteration added)); Bethel, 478 U.S. at 681
(noting that schools perform the fundamental function of inculcating students with
the values their parents deem important); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (observing that
states and school officials have primary authority "to prescribe and control conduct
in the schools").
169. See New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985) ("Today's public
school officials do not merely exercise authority voluntarily conferred on them by
individual parents; rather, they act in furtherance of publicly mandated educational
and disciplinary policies.").
170. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (recognizing the
"fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of their children").
Constitution requires that the state refrain from censoring speech with
which it disagrees.17 1 Moreover, the EAA and its requirements embody
the First Amendment principle that the state should not be in the business
of completely censoring the viewpoints of its students. 1
72
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 73 the Supreme Court stressed
that:
"The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms
is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools." The classroom is peculiarly
the "marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future
depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues,
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection."
174
Thirty years later, this language still rings true. Like the Tinker court,
which extended broad Free Speech protection during the social unrest of
the Vietnam War era, today we find ourselves in a period of social and
political upheaval-a time in which it is important that we keep
discourse wide open and inclusive. Nowhere is this more important than
in our public schools. Schools that choose to keep a limited open forum
for their students must recognize that providing equal access to all
student groups is not only demanded by the Constitution and the EAA; it
is necessary in order to fully realize the goals of democracy.
171. See Police Dep't. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)
(emphasizing that "above all else, the First Amendment means that government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or
its content").
172. See Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1141 (C.D.
Cal. 2000) ("Though the state education system has the awesome responsibility of
inculcating moral and political values, that does not permit educators to act as
'thought police' inhibiting all discussion that is not approved by, and in accord with
the official position of, the state.").
173. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
174. Id. at 603 (alteration in original) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 487 (1960); United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943))
(internal citation omitted) (holding that a state law prohibiting state employment of
any person who advocates the overthrow of the government was unconstitutionally
vague).
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